THE USE OF AREQUEST,@@ AWISH@@, ADESIRE@@:
PRECATORY TRUST OR NOT?
Frank L. Schiavo
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INTRODUCTION
AStarlight, starbright, first star I see tonight, I wish I
may, I wish I might, have the wish I wish tonight.@ How many
times have we heard or used that childhood refrain during our
lifetime? We use such words even though we know that wishing
won=t make things come true. Those Awish@ words are what the law
characterizes as precatory words - words that convey a
recommendation rather than a positive command or direction. We
often see them used in wills to express a settlor=s intent to
create a trust, sometimes being interpreted to impose an
obligation on those to whom they are directed - and sometimes
not. This article includes a history of the courts=
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interpretations of those expressions and asks whether there is
any bright line test in analyzing the settlor=s intent to create
a trust when precatory words or expressions are used.
I BACKGROUND
AA trust is, generally speaking, a device whereby a trustee
manages property as a fiduciary for one or more beneficiaries.
The trustee holds legal title to the property.... The
2

beneficiaries hold equitable title....@ The settlor, the one who
creates the trust, need only manifest an intent (by words or
conduct) that the property (the Ares@) be held in trust for the
beneficiary (the Acestui que trust@) for some purpose.
Nothing more than a manifestation of intent to create a
3

trust is necessary. The United States Supreme Court has held,
ANo technical language is necessary to the creation of a
trust.... If it appears to be the intention of the parties from
the whole instrument creating it that the property conveyed is to
be held or dealt with for the benefit of another, a court of
2

Wills, Trusts, and Estates, Dukeminier, Johanson,
Lindgren & Sitkoff, 7th Ed., Aspen Publishers, 2005, p. 485.
3

Scott, The Law of Trusts (4th Ed., 1987) ' 17.1, except
for trusts of real estate for which a writing is required under
the Statute of Frauds or where the disposition is testamentary
and must comply with the applicable Statute of Wills. Not even a
transfer of property is required since the owner may declare
himself a trustee of his property for others. Id. ' 17.1. See
also Restatement (Third) of Trusts ' 13 (2003): AA trust is
created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to
create a trust relationship.@

2

4

equity will affix to it the character of a trust....@ Thus,
where a person=s intent is to separate legal ownership from
equitable ownership, a valid trust comes into existence.

5

It is precisely because the formality of creating a trust is
so informal that so much uncertainty has arisen where persons
attempt that creation without a writing. But lack of a writing is
really not the issue; it=s the language used, whether or not it=s
written.

6

In the normal course of events, the manifested intent of the
4

Colton v. Colton 127 U.S. 300, 310 (1887)

5

Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, ' 1 (2d Ed.
1979); see also Penny v. White, 594 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. App. 1980)
where, at p. 639, the court states AA valid express trust comes
into existence when a person with a present power of disposition
over definable property reposes the legal ownership to that res
in another for the beneficial use of a third person.@ It must
also be remembered that the mere use of the words Atrust@ or
Atrustee@ does not, ipso facto, create a trust. Restatement
(Third) of Trusts '13, comment b (2003); Bogert, The Law of
Trusts and Trustees, ' 11 (6th Ed. 1987)
6

The issue of whether a Aprecatory trust@ is created may
arise not only in a testamentary disposition, but also in other
instruments: a deed to the Vestry and Wardens of a parish Afor
the purpose of aiding in the establishment of a Home for Indigent
Widows or Orphans@ was expressive of motive and given the same
interpretation as being precatory, St. James Parish v. Bagley, 50
S.E. 841 (N.C. 1905); see also Marx v. Rice, 65 A.2d 48 (N.J.
1949) where the precatory words were held not to create a
mandatory duty upon a holder of a power of appointment. And in
TAM 9722001, the settlor was Adesirous@ that the trustee
distribute the trust principal in accordance with the
beneficiary=s wishes. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that the
precatory language did not give the beneficiary a power of
appointment.

3

settlor is clearly expressed in a document - either in an intervivos instrument or in a testamentary document. Yet even though
the intent may be expressly stated, the trust may still fail for
7

8

lack of a trust res, a lack of identifiable beneficiaries, or
because the equitable duties imposed upon the trustee are too
vague to be enforced.

9

This intent must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.

10

If the language in the will plainly and unambiguously expresses
7

In Brainerd v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.
1937), the taxpayer orally declared a trust of his expected
profits from stock trading during the following year. Although
there was an express declaration of trust intent, the court held
that there was no res at the time of the declaration and the
trust failed because there was no additional declaration when the
profits came into existence. The trust failed for want of a res.
8

In Clark v. Campbell, 133 A. 166 (N.H. 1926), the
testator declared a trust of his property not distributed during
his lifetime and directed the trustees to distribute the same Ato
such of my friends and they, my trustees, shall select.@ The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire held at p. 168 that ABy the common
law there cannot be a valid bequest to an indefinite person.
There must be a beneficiary or a class of beneficiaries indicated
in the will capable of coming into court and claiming the benefit
of the bequest.@ Thus, although there was a clear expression to
create a trust, it failed for a lack of definite beneficiaries.
9

Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. Jr. 399, 406, 32
Eng. Rept. 656, 659: ABut here there is no specific purpose
pointed out, to which the residue is to be applied....@ Scott,
The Law of Trusts (4th Ed. 1987), ' 123(3); Restatement (Third)
of Trusts ' 13, comments a, d (2003)
10

Matter of Bollinger, 943 P.2d 981 (Mont. 1997):
A...evidence which is unmistakable, clear, satisfactory and
convincing.@; see also, Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, ' 49, (2nd
Rev. Ed., 1982)

4

the intention of the testator, extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to show an intention different from that expressed in
11

the will.

But extrinsic evidence of surrounding facts and

circumstances may be admitted to explain the language of a will
when uncertainty arises as to the testator=s true intention.
13

What happens when a trust fails? In Briggs v. Penny,

12

it is

declared: AIf a testator gives upon trust, though he never adds a
syllable to denote the objects of that trust, or though he
declares the trust in such a way as not to exhaust the property,
or though he declares it imperfectly, or though the trusts are
illegal, still in all these cases, as is well known, the legatee
is excluded, and the next of kin take.@ In other words, the trust
fails and there is a resulting trust back to the next of kin.
II WHAT ARE PRECATORY WORDS?
PRECATORY is defined as Ahaving the nature of prayer,
request, or entreaty; conveying or embodying a recommendation or
advice or the expression of a wish, but not a positive command or
direction.@

14

PRECATORY WORDS are AWords of entreaty, request, desire,

11

Woodcock v. McCord, 295 P.2d 734 (Wash. 1931)

12

In re Estate of Curry, 988 P.2d 505 (Wash.App. 1995)

13

3 Mac. & G. 546, 42 Eng. Rept. 371, 375 (1851)

14

Black=s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., West Publishing Co.,

1990

5

wish, or recommendation, employed in wills, as distinguished from
direct and imperative terms.@

15

Professor Bogert expresses it as follows:
The words Arequest,@ Adesire,@ and the like, do
not naturally import to most persons a legal
obligation....but that such an obligation may
be shown by other portions
of the instrument
16
or by extrinsic evidence.
PRECATORY TRUST is AA trust created by certain words, which
are more like words of entreaty and permission than of command or
certainty. Examples of such words, which the courts have held
sufficient to constitute a trust, are >wish and request,= >have
fullest confidence,= >heartily beseech,= and the like.@

17

Labeling a trust as Aprecatory@ is misleading. For if the
words indicating intent are merely precatory rather than
directional or imperative, a trust is not created. Where the
words are directional or imperative, a trust is created. AIf
there be a trust sufficiently expressed and capable of
enforcement by a court of equity, it does not disparage, much
less defeat it, to call it a precatory trust.@

18

AThe conflict of

opinion as to the effect of words of this character is almost
15

Id.

16

Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, (Rev. 2nd Ed.

1984)
17

Black=s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, West Publishing

Co., 1990
18

Supra, footnote 3, at 312

6

bewildering.@

19

In the strictest sense, a precatory Atrust@ is an

oxymoron but courts have adopted this expression to apply to the
implied trust created by precatory words or expressions.
It is not required that the settlor realize that he is
creating a trust.
decide.

21

20

It is a question of law for the court to

The obvious question then is what is the intent being

manifested by the >settlor= by his use of precatory words.

22

In making the determination AAccount should be taken of the
relative situations of the parties, the ties of affection
subsisting between them, and the motives which would naturally
influence the mind of the testator, as well as the existence of a
moral duty on his part toward the party who will benefit from
compliance with his desires and recommendations.@

23

A... [T]he use

of the precatory words... must be given the effect the testator
intended them to have.@
19

24

In other words, all the facts and

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 42 N.E. 465, 467 (Ind. 1895)

20

Where the owner of bearer bonds delivers then to X and
tells X to sell them and deliver the proceeds to B, X holds the
bonds in trust for B. Restatement (Third) of Trusts, ' 13,
comment a (2003), Illustration 2.
21

Matter of Bollinger, 943 P.2d 981 (Mont. 1997)

22

i.e., A...what is the meaning of the language used...,@
Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, 127 N.W. 673, 674 (Mich. 1910): a
bequest to the owner of a sanitarium "to be used as he sees best
for carrying on the work of relieving suffering" did not create a
precatory trust.
23

Cumming v. Pendleton, 153 A. 175, 177 (Conn. 1931)

24

Lewis v. Atkins, 105 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ind. 1952). See

7

circumstances are to be taken into account.

25

It is therefore seen

that the same word, e.g., Awish,@ may give rise to a trust in one
circumstance but not in another

26

because @Precedents are of

little value in matters involving the construction of wills.@

27

III HISTORY
In re Estate of Curry, 988 P2d 505 (Wash.App. 1999) which applied
the seven criteria of Restatement (Second) of Trusts ' 25,
comment b (1959) to find a trust by the use of the words AI
trust@ the devisee will give an equal share to the other
children. See also Penny v. White, supra, footnote 4.
25

Restatement (Third) of Trusts ' 13 comment d (2003)
states the factors to be considered:
(1) the specific terms and overall tenor of
the words used; (2) the definiteness or
indefiniteness of the property involved; (3)
the ease or
difficulty of ascertaining
possible trust purposes and terms, and the
specificity or vagueness of the possible
beneficiaries and their interests; (4) the
interests or motives and the nature and
degree of concerns that may reasonably be
supposed to have influenced the transferor;
(5) the financial situation, dependencies,
and expectations of the parties; (6) the
transferor=s prior conduct, statements, and
relationships with respect to possible trust
beneficiaries; (7) the personal and any
fiduciary
relationships
between
the
transferor and the transferee; (8) other
dispositions the transferor is making or has
made of his or her wealth; and (9) whether
the result of construing the disposition as
involving a trust or not would be such as a
person in the situation of the transferor
would be likely to desire.
26

AThe use of precatory words in a given will may be
sufficient to create a precatory trust whereas the same words in
another will may not.@ Centerre Trust Company of St. Louis v. The
United States of America, 676 F.Supp. 928, 934 (U.S.D.C., E.D.
Mo. 1988)
27

In re Hellman=s Estate, 266 N.W. 36, 38 (Iowa 1936)
8

A Pennsylvania case traces the origin of precatory trusts to
Roman law:
It was part of the Roman law that the devisee
or legatee, accepting the estate of a
decedent, became at once personally charged
with the payment of all his debts, whether
the estate was sufficient to discharge them
or not; and by way of compensation it was
made discretionary with him to pay any of the
legacies bequeathed by the testator. Hence,
when all such bequests could be thus defeated
at the pleasure of the devisee or legatee,
there was no alternative left to the testator
but to incorporate in his will an appeal to
the devisee or legatee to make the desired
disposition. Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. St.
268. The hardship of this law finally
compelled the courts to declare that words of
recommendation, request, entreaty, wish, or
explanation, addressed to the devisee or
legatee, will make him a trustee for the
person or persons in whose favor such
expressions are used, (1
Jarm. Wills, 385;)
28
whence precatory trusts.
The early view was that precatory words were mandatory. In
29

the 1704 case of Eeles v. England,

the devise was of ,300 Amy

will and desire is, that he will give the said ,300 unto his
daughter Susan at the time of his death or sooner....@ The equity
court held that the words AI desire, or I will, in a will amount
unto an express devise.@

30

31

This view continued in Harding v. Glyn.

There the

28

Board of Foreign Missions of United Presbyterian Church
v. Culp, 25 A. 117, 118 (Pa. 1892).
29

2 Vern. 467, 23 Eng. Rept. 901 (1704); see also Forbes
v. Ball, 3 Mer. 437, 36 Eng. Rept. 168 (1817)
30

Id. at 901.

31

1 Atk. 489, 26 Eng. Rept. 299 (1739)

9

testator=s will gave a house and belongings to his wife Abut did
desire her at or before her death to give@ such estate among his
own deserving relations. She bequeathed the property to others.
The court found two issues. First, whether the wife was intended
to take only a beneficial interest and second, if so, who was to
take after her death. As to the first issue, the court found A...
it is clear the wife was intended to take only beneficially
during her life...and the words willing or desiring have been
frequently construed to amount to a trust....@ However, because
there was doubt as who was to take after her, the court awarded
the property to the husband=s next of kin.
32

In Brown v. Higgs,

the testator Aauthorized and empowered@

his nephew to receive excess rents from certain real estate and
Ato employ@ that excess to children of other nephews as he shall
think most deserving. The court held that a trust was created. In
affirming the decision,

33

the court said that by using the term

Ato employ,@ he is clearly made a trustee.
35

Again, in Cruwyn v. Colman,

34

the bequest was to the

testator=s sister, also the executrix, adding that A... it is my
absolute desire that [she]... bequeaths at her own death to those
32

Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. Jun. 708 (1799)

33

5 Ves. Jun. 495 (1800)

34

Id. at 506

35

9 Ves. Jun. 319, 37 Eng. Rept. 626 (1804)

10

of her own family what she has in her own power to dispose of,
that was mine....@ The court, Sir William Grant, without
discussion said, AThere is no doubt, that in this instance the
words are sufficiently certain to raise a trust.@

36

Weeks after the Cruwyn case, Sir Grant decided the case of
37

Morice v. The Bishop of Durham.

There the bequest was to the

Bishop Ato dispose of the ultimate residue to such objects of
benevolence and liberality as [he] in his own discretion shall
most approve of....@ Although there was a trust, the court said
it failed for want of certainty of an object.
39

In Wright v. Atkyns,

38

the devise was of all real estate to

the testator=s mother (he, the son, being unmarried) Aand her
heirs forever, in the fullest confidence that after her decease
36

Id. at 323

37

9 Ves. Jun. 399, 32 Eng. Rept. 656 (1804), affirmed at
10 Ves. Jun. 522, 32 Eng. Rept. 947 (1805) by Lord Chancellor
Eldon; also cited in Knight v. Knight, infra, footnote 46.
38

In affirming on appeal, Lord Chancellor Eldon said at
p. 952: APrima facie an absolute interest was given; and the
question was, whether precatory, not mandatory, words imposed a
trust upon that person; and the Court has said , before these
words or request or accommodation create a trust, it must be
shewn [sic], that the object and the subject are certain; and it
is not immaterial to this case, that it must be shewn [sic], that
the objects are certain. If neither the objects nor the subject
are certain, then the recommendation or request does not create a
trust .... Where the subject ... and objects are to be found in a
Will not expressly creating a trust, [the indefinite subject and
objects] are always used by the Court as Evidence that the mind
of the testator was not to create a trust.@
39

Turn. & R. 156, 37 Eng. Rept. 1051 (1823)

11

she will devise the property to my family....@ Lord Chancellor
Eldon held that the words were imperative.

40

This view prevailed in the United States as well. In Ingram
41

v. Fraley,

the testator gave his entire estate to his friend,

having the confidence Athat he will entirely carry out my wishes
and desires... and knowing that my said friend will, by this
will, be able much more effectively to dispose of my estate.@ The
Georgia Supreme Court held that the court must determine whether,
from the terms employed, an absolute gift was intended or whether
only legal title was conveyed to enable him to carry out a
fiduciary duty. It concluded that even though a trust was
intended to be created, it failed because it was not sufficiently
42

declared.
40

Id. at 1056: AIn order to determine whether the trust
is a trust this Court will interfere with, it is a matter of
observation. First, that the words must be imperative, that the
words are imperative in this case there can be no doubt;
Secondly, that the subject must be certain, and that brings me to
the question what is meant by the words Athe property@; and
Thirdly, that the object must be as certain as the subject, and
then the question will be, whether the words Amy family@ have as
much of the quality of certainty, as this species of trust
requires.@ [emphasis added].
41

29 Ga. 553 (1859)

42

A...[W]ould any Court hold, that the words of this will
were not imperative ....? Surely not. Chancery would decree, it
has done often, upon words less mandatory, that there was no
discretion left to the legatee, but an obligation imposed upon
his conscience by the will, not inclining him merely, but
compelling him to execute the testator=s purpose. Such, at any
rate, is our interpretation of the will.@ The court relied on
Briggs v. Penny, supra footnote 12.

12

In Board of Foreign Missions of United Presbyterian Church
43

v. Culp,

the Pennsylvania court said:
Where, however, words of recommendation,
request, and the like are used in direct
reference to the estate, they are prima facie
testamentary
and
imperative,
and
not
precatory. Thus, should the testator say
merely, 'I desire A.B. to have one thousand
dollars,' it would be as effectual a legacy
as if he was expressly to direct or will it,
or were to add 'out of my estate,'
or that it
44
should be paid by his executor.

The Eels case

Means,

46

45

was cited as authority in McRee=s Adm=rs v.

where a wife gave, devised and bequeathed all her

property to her husband, Ahis heirs and assigns forever, to his
use, behoof and benefit, in fee simple; but should my said
husband die without issue of his body, it is my wish and will he
shall give all of said property to Robert P. Means.@ Upon her
husband=s death Aintestate and without issue of his body,@ his
administrators took possession of the property and Robert P.
Means brought a Bill in Equity to establish a precatory trust.
The court said, AWhile the word >will,= per se, has an imperative
force, we do not doubt that its meaning may be controlled by the
context...@ yet held that a trust was created for Means= benefit.
43

Supra, footnote 27.

44

Id. at 118

45

Supra, footnote 28

46

34 Ala. 349 (1859), 1859 WL 745 (Ala.)

13

IV TRANSITION
Near the middle of the 19

th

century, courts in England and

the United States began to abandon the idea that mere precatory
words created an imperative interpretation. In its place they
searched for the real intent of the settlor which was rightfully
becoming the hallmark in the creation of a trust.
Foundation for the trend was given impetus as early as 1839
by Lord Langdale in Knight v. Knight
48

language of Wright v. Atkyns,

47

where he agreed with the

that precatory language will

create a trust:
1. If the words are so used that, upon the
whole,
they
ought
to
be
construed
as
imperative;
2.
If
the
subject
of
the
recommendation or wish be certain; and 3. If
the objects or persons intended to have the
benefit of the recommendation or wish be also
certain.
However, Lord Langdale did not agree with the result in

Wright and held a trust was not created. The language, AI trust
to the liberality of my successors to reward any other of my old
servants and tenants according to their deserts...@ was not
sufficiently imperative,

49

the subject to be affected and the

47

3 Beav. 148, 49 Eng. Rept. 58 (1839)

48

Supra, footnote 38.

49

This is in contrast to the words Aabsolute desire@ in
Cruwyn v. Coleman, supra, footnote 34, which case was cited in
Knight v. Knight, supra, footnote 46.

14

interests to be enjoyed by the objects were not sufficiently
defined to create a trust. In modern terms, Lord Langdale would
be adopting a Aplain meaning@ of the precatory words.
Some 45 years later, Lindley, L.J., expresses his agreement
50

in In re Adams and the Kensington Vestry.

AI am very glad to see

that the current is changed, and that beneficiaries are not to be
made trustees unless intended to be so by the testator.@ In the
same case, Cotton, L.J. states, AI have no hesitation in saying
myself, that I think some of the older authorities went a great
deal too far in holding that some particular words appearing in a
will were sufficient to create a trust... we have to see what is
their true effect.@
The Ingram case

51

that holds precatory words are imperative

was effectively overruled when, in 1863, Georgia enacted Code '
2299 causing Ingram to fall short of meeting the requirements of
that section. The Code section read:
Precatory or recommendatory words will create
a trust if they are sufficiently imperative
to show that it is not left discretionary
with the party to act or not, and if the
subject matter of the trust is defined with
sufficient certainty, and if the object is
also certainly defined, and 52the mode in which
the trust is to be executed.
50

27 Ch.Div. 394 (1884)

51

Supra, footnote 40

52

The current statute, ' 53-12-21(b), is similar: AWords
otherwise precatory in nature will create a trust only if they
are sufficiently imperative to show a settlor=s intention to

15

It is clear that precatory words alone will not now, per se,
establish a trust in Georgia.
But a trust may still be established there. In 1886, parents
wanted to make a settlement of all their property to their
daughter by will of the father to protect the property for the
daughter=s benefit. The wife was granted permission to execute a
quit claim deed of real estate to her husband to enable him to
will it to their daughter. The husband died, his wife having
predeceased him, without a valid will. The property was taken
possession of by his administrator and the daughter sued
contending the transaction between her parents amounted to a
trust for her and thus she was entitled to possession of the
53

property.

The court held that under the circumstances, a valid

trust was created. It said:
Whenever a manifest intention is exhibited
that another person shall have the benefit of
the property,
the grantee shall be declared a
54
trustee.
impose enforceable duties on a trustee, and if all other elements
of an express trust are present.@
53

McCreary v. Gewinner, 29 S.E. 960 (Ga. 1898)

54

Id. at 963; also at 963: AAnd where a person has used
language from which it can be gathered that he intended to create
a trust, and such intention is not negatived by the surrounding
circumstances, and the settler [sic] had done such things as are
necessary in equity to bind himself not to recede from that
intention, and the trust property is of such a nature as to be
legally capable of being settled, and the object of the trust is
lawful, and the settler [sic] has complied with the provisions of
law as to evidence, a good and valid declaration of trust has

16

This transition is also pointed out in Knox, Exec=r v. Knox,
55

et al:

While, on the one hand, we are inclined not
to go to the extent of older cases in England
and in this country, in establishing trusts
upon the strength of precatory words used by
a testator in his will, on the other, we are
not disposed to repudiate the whole doctrine
of such trusts.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed with the
56

transition in Aldrich v. Aldrich, : AIf an arbitrary rule seems
to have been laid down at one time in regard to what would
constitute a precatory trust, there can be no doubt, we think,
that the tendency of later decisions has been, if not to relax
the rule thus laid down, at least not to extend it.@ This is
evidenced in Lloyd v. Lloyd

57

where that same court, a mere three

months later, affirmed Aldrich where the devise was to a wife:
AHaving full faith and confidence in my beloved wife... [to] look
after the welfare of our children@ and held no precatory trust

(prima facie) been made.@
55

18 N.W. 155, (Wisc. 1884)

56

51 N.E. 449 (Mass. 1898); see also Pratt v. Trustees of
Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, 42 A. 51 (Md. 1898): AWhatever
may have been the results reached in the earlier cases on this
subject, there is a strong tendency nowadays to restrict the
doctrine of precatory trusts within more reasonable, and somewhat
narrower, bounds than formerly....@ In Pratt, the words Amy wish
and will@ did not give rise to a precatory trust.
57

53 N.E. 148 (Mass. 1899)

17

was created.

58

59

And yet in Temple v. Russell,

the court said, AThe words >It

is also my will= are more than a mere entreaty or expression of
desire. They are words of command. They express an imperative
testamentary design.@ The bequest of real estate Ato hold or
dispose of as he desires or deems best@ was coupled in the same
paragraph that it was the testator=s Awill and wish@ that the
devisee give the property to a charity. The later case of

O=Reilly v. Irving,

60

distinguished Temple because the devise of

the residue to Mary Irving was in the eleventh paragraph and a
second devise of the residue - to be effective on her death - was
in the fourteenth paragraph to a charity.
61

Kentucky also expressed its agreement in Igo v. Irvine:

A... the later English and American cases have departed from the
58

See also Rector v. Alcorn, 41 So. 370 (Miss. 1906),
where similar words were in the will of a Mississippi Governor,
the Supreme Court declaring that no precatory trust was created.
Cf. Seefried v. Clarke, 74 S.E. 204 (Va. 1912) and Harrison v.
Harrison, 43 Va. 1, 1845 WL 2887 (Va.), to the contrary.
59

146 N.E. 679 (Mass. 1925); and in In re Hochbrunn=s
Estate, 244 P. 698 (Wash. 1926), the court held a trust was
created where the testator, in one continuous paragraph, devised
his residuary estate with a Aspecial request@ that the brother
pay their sister $10,000. A...[T]he courteous language used makes
it no less imperative....@ The reasoning in Hochbrunn was applied
in In re Estate of Curry, 988 P2d 505 (Wash.App. 1999) in finding
the words AI trust@ were imperative.
60

188 N.E. 253 (Mass. 1933)

61

70 S.W. 826 (Ky. 1902)
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doctrine of the early cases, and have inclined toward the
doctrine giving precatory words and expressions only their
natural force.@ And in interpreting Missouri law, the 8th Circuit
said: AThe tendency of the modern decisions, both in England and
in this country, is to restrict the practice which deduces a
trust from the expression by a testator of a wish, desire, or
recommendation regarding the disposition of property absolutely
bequeathed.@

62

AThe tendency of modern decisions, however, is not

to extend the rule of practice which, from words of doubtful
meaning, deduces or implies a trust.@
Maine=s Judicial Court

64

63

expressed the transition in this

manner:
It is said that the leaning of the courts is
against the implication of a trust from words
of confidence, that the current of decisions
is now changed, and that many expressions
formerly held to be indicative of a trust
would not now be so held. Pom.Eq.Jur. ' 1015.
We think this means merely that courts now
place less reliance than formerly upon the
precise words used, and more upon the meaning
of the will or the particular bequest, taken
as a whole. The intention of the testator must
be found from the whole will.
Despite this trend, Virginia has held that a bequest of a

62

Burnes, v. Burnes, 137 F. 781 (8th Cir. 1905)

63

Bryan v. Milby, 24 A. 333, 334 (Del.Ch. 1891); See also
St. James Parish v. Bagley, supra, footnote 5.
64

Clifford v. Stewart, 49 A. 52 (Me. 1901)
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wife to her husband Awith one simple request@ created a precatory
65

trust,

yet Michigan held that a bequest Awith the earnest

request@ that the funds be used for religious works did not.
In Ryder v. Myers

67

66

the Court said that the early

construction that if a testator Arecommended,@ entreated,@
Arequested,@ or Awished,@ to dispose of absolutely devised
property, would be held to be imperative and create a trust.
However, it modified that stance by also stating that, despite
that being the rule for more than half a century and cannot be
questioned, Aan implied trust will not arise unless the person or
object intended to be benefitted thereby is properly and
definitely described, and the amount of property to which the
trust shall attach is sufficiently defined.@ It then held a
bequest of Aall... my jewelry@ to one Mrs. Blumenthal coupled
with a Arequest@ to honor requests of family members created a
precatory trust.
V OTHER ASPECTS
There are other early decisions that decide the issue by
relying on the rule that once a fee estate is conveyed, later
language limiting that estate is repugnant and will be ignored.

65

Seefried v. Clarke, 74 S.E. 204 (Va. 1912)

66

In re Stuart=s Estate: Slingerland v. Cederlund, 264
N.W. 372 (Mich. 1936)
67

167 A. 22 (N.J.Chanc. 1933)
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In other words, a distinction is drawn between cases where the
gift is for life only and those in which the gift is absolute,
with super-added words.

68

69

In Irvine v. Irvine,

the testator left his wife real estate

Ato have and to hold the same during her natural life... and at
her death the said land is to be sold, and the proceeds of that
sale is to be divided equally among my children living at the
time of my said wife=s death.@ The court held that the gift was in
fee and the subsequent words did not take away or diminish the
70

fee.

The result in an earlier Virginia case was the same. While
the testator devised his wife a life estate, he also gave her the
right to dispose of it during her life with anything remaining to
be distributed in various shares and estates to his children and
grandchildren. The court held no precatory trust was created. AIt
is enough that the testator places the subject at the disposal of
his wife... it has been decided that the whole interest and
68

Williams v. Worthington, 1878 WL 6817 (Md.); see also
Spears v. Ligon, 1883 WL 9141 (Tex.) where the Texas Supreme
Court discussed both rules (citing Massachusetts case law) but
decided the issue on the basis that, under the circumstances, a
precatory trust was not created. See Morice v. Bishop of Durham,
supra, footnote 36: AThere can be no trust, over the exercise of
which this Court will not assume control; for an uncontrollable
power of disposition would be ownership, and not trust.@
69

136 P. 18 (Or. 1913)

70

In accord, Harkness v. Zelly, 135 A. 347 (N.J.Chanc.

1926).
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property of the subject vests in her.@

71

72

Reasons for this view are stated in Fullenwider v. Watson.
... [I]t would be very difficult or impossible to determine
whether any part of the fund remained undisposed of or not;

73

it

would be contrary to the party=s well being to lead him to spend
all that was given him and might be at the expense of those for
whom he was under a moral obligation to make some provision; he
might be disposed to convert the property and dispose of the
avails lavishly thus defeating the method of distribution
directed by the law.
In considering all the surrounding circumstances, courts
sometimes rely on to whom the precatory words are addressed.

74

71

May v. Joynes 1871 WL 4870 (Va.); however see Bohon v.
Barrett=s Exec=r, 1881 WL 8255 (Ky.), where it is said, A... where
a testator makes an absolute gift to one person, accompanying it
with a request to appropriate a particular sum to the use of
another, that the immediate devisee becomes a mere trustee to the
extent of such sum .... An absolute gift does not contravene
either an express or implied trust annexed to the gift.@
72

14 N.E. 571 (Ind. 1887)

73

See Bryan v. Milby, supra, footnote 62, where, in a
case of first impression, the Delaware court said that A... there
being no certainty as to the existence of a remainder, that no
precatory trust arose ....@
74

One California case does not agree: in In re Shirley=s
Estate, 181 P. 777, 778 (Cal. 1919), the court said: AThe fact
that the clause here involved is not formally addressed or
directed to any person as one by whom the bequest should be set
aside is of no importance. Where words are used which dispose of
property or impose a condition upon a bequest given elsewhere in
the will, they need not be addressed to any one. It is enough
that they show the intent and will of the testatrix regarding the

22

For example, in In re Hood=s Estate,

75

the testator devised

her estate to trustees and Aauthorized and empowered@ them to
distribute the estate to such charities or individuals as they
should see fit, while also enumerating her Aexpress desire[s].@
The court held that the precatory words, since they were directed
to trustees, were mandatory. AThe usual rule is that an
expression of desire on the part of a testator is a mere request
when addressed to his devisee but is to be construed as a command
when addressed to his executor....

76

No good reason appears why

the expression of such a desire should not similarly be construed
as a command when it is addressed to a trustee, particularly when
it is expressly set forth as a part of the directions to the
trustee and as stating one of the purposes of the trust.@

Penny v. White

78

77

combines precatory words not only to a

property or legacy. If they do this, the court and the law will
carry it out by probating the will and distributing the estate as
is provided therein.@
75

135 P.2d 383 (Cal.App.2d 1943)

76

Citing In re Estate of Lawrence, 108 P.2d 893 (Cal.
1941); In re Estate of Mallon, 93 P.2d 245 (Cal.App.2d 1939)
77

In re Hood=s Estate at 385, supra, footnote 74; see
also Baker v. McBride, 111 N.W.2d 407 (Wisc. 1961), where a trust
was established when the precatory words Amy executor shall pay@
were addressed to the executor who was an unrelated party, an
attorney and the scrivener of the will: APrecatory words directed
to an executor indicate a trust while the same words to a devisee
do not.@
78

Supra, footnote 4
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spouse but also to the spouse as trustee.

It found the

surrounding circumstances expressed an intent to create a trust
where the language used was a Arequest.@ In the course of
contempt proceedings for failure to comply with an order of child
support, the court construed the parties= property settlement
agreement. It provided, inter alia, that the residence be
conveyed to the wife. It further provided that the husband
Arequests@ that his equity in the jointly owned residence, $7,000
at the time of the divorce, upon the sale of the residence, be
held in trust for their children. The trial court awarded the
$7,000 to the husband outright. On appeal, the court held the
precatory word established a trust because the extrinsic evidence
showed that the husband intended to command his equity be taken
by the wife as trustee. The wife assumed the equity was for the
children=s college education and the trust was the device to
accomplish that purpose; the husband Aunderstood@ that the equity
would be applied toward child support or Aput in a trust fund for
the kids.@ Thus testimony from both parties showed that they
agreed that the husband=s equity would be held by the wife as
trustee for the children.

79

Other courts do not so regard that direction. In Estate of

79

Bohon v. Barrett=s Exec=r, supra, footnote 70 combines
precatory words to a brother/executor and finds the bequest was
to be in trust. A... the slightest wish of the testator should be
binding upon the conscience of his brother.@ [emphasis added]
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Reynolds,

80

the testatrix made a Arequest@ that the Trustee

distribute any funds remaining after the death of her father to a
Rev. Armstrong who @shall use the money so received by him in the
promotion and furtherance of his Radio Ministry and the spreading
of the Gospel as he may see fit....@ The court said, AA testator=s
use of the word >request= does not necessarily create a precatory
trust, and it never does unless in other parts of the will a
plain intention appears to create a trust.@ Since the language of
the will allowed him to either apply the funds for religious
purposes or keep it for his own benefit, no trust was created. He
was free Ato do as he liked with the property.@

81

In this case the

Trustee was an unrelated party who was an attorney.

82

That the testator Arecommends@ the devisee to will the
property to certain persons at her death fares no better. In
83
Goslee=s Adm=r v. Goslee=s Exec=r, the husband Arecommended@ to the

wife certain persons as proper ones to inherit should she die
intestate. The court held that no precatory trust was created and
that the wife took the estate in fee simple.
80

800 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.App.E.D., 1990)

81

Id., at 800

82

See also Norris v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
134 F.2d 796 (7th Cir., 1943) where individual trustees (one the
testatrix=s son) were Aauthorized and empowered@ not only to name
charities as legatees but to determine the amount of the gift.
The court held no trust was created.
83

94 S.W. 638 (Ky.App. 1906)
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84

And in Murphy v. Carlin,

the Testator provided that it was

his Awish and desire that my wife

85

continue to provide for care

comfort, and education@ of the five year old whom they took into
their family when he was orphaned and raised as their own. After
stating that precatory words will impose a binding duty upon the
devisee, by way of trust, provided there is certainty as to
subject matter and object of the trust (which were sufficiently
and clearly pointed out in this case), it said A... it is to be
remembered that the devisee is the wife of the testator, between
whom it is not expected that commands would be expressed in such
forcible language as between strangers.@

86

87

In a later Nebraska case, Page v. Buchfinck,

a bequest to

the testator=s wife Aupon the hope, desire and belief@ she would
leave her property to their children did not create a trust by
precatory words, finding that the choice of words only Aindicates
a suggestion of a result he would like to see accomplished.@
The same mandatory interpretation does not prevail where the
84

20 S.W. 786 (Mo. 1892); see also Major v. Herndon, 1879
WL 6692 (Ky.)
85

who was not also named as a trustee

86

Id. at 787; cf: Thompson v. Smith, 300 S.W.2d 404
(Mo.1957) where Awish@ was held insufficient to create a
precatory trust. In Hayes v. Hayes, 145 S.W. 1155 (Mo. 1912), the
Missouri Supreme Court said A...the law does not undertake to
enforce duties of imperfect obligation. These rest in foro
conscientiae.@
87

275 N.W.2d 826 (Nebr. 1979)
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words are directed to a devisee who is a relative other than a
spouse. In Morris v. Morris,

88

the precatory words, Aher wish that

the property would be used@ for children, were directed to a
relative, the court holding that a trust was not established.

89

And even where the words were directed to a son, also an
executor, a Arequest that my Executors see that [a granddaughter]
is given sufficient funds to complete her education@ did not
create a trust.

90

This is also the case when the words are directed to
91

siblings. In Sanger v. Sanger,

testator provides, AIn the event

I own a home as of the date of my death, it is my wish that if
any child of mine wishes to reside in such home he or she shall
be allowed to by my other children.@ No trust arose. And see In

re Campbell

92

that lists cases where Awish@ is held to create a

trust and cases where it does not and also stating that,
AGenerally speaking, a wish is a wish, and nothing more, unless
the testator used it in such a way as to indicate a different
88

327 N.E.2d 917 (Mass.App. 1975)

89

Decedent=s father=s testamentary Awish@ that his stocks
be placed in trust was insufficient to create a precatory trust
under Missouri law. Centerre Trust Co. of St. Louis, v. The
United States of America, 676 F. Supp. 928 (D.C.E.D. Mo., 1988)
90

Pittman v. Thomas, 299 S.E.2d 207 (N.C. 1983)

91

673 N.W.2d 411 (Wisc.App. 2003)

92

229 N.W. 247 (Iowa 1930)

27

intention.@

93

94

Also compare Magnus v. Magnus,

where the disposition was to

a niece Ato dispose of in accordance with my instructions to
her,@ the court finding a trust had been created and Newhall v.
95

McGill,

where the disposition was for the property to be

Adisposed of according to my personal directions,@ the court
finding a trust was not created.
In a curious decision, a Georgia court held that where a
wife devised her home to her mother for life with remainder to
her son, but that Ait is my wish@ her husband be permitted to
reside in the residence for his life, the will did not create a
precatory trust but created a joint life estate between the
96

parties.

The difficulty courts have in determining the settlor=s
intent when precatory words are used is illustrated by two cases
decided by the Supreme Court of Washington. In Woodcock v.
97

McCord,

the testator gave the residue of his estate to trustees

and Asuggested@ that they sell his sawmill plant to a corporation
to be organized by his employees, also suggesting that all
93

Id. 248

94

84 A. 705 (N.J.Chanc. 1912); in this case, however, the
trust failed for uncertainty as to the objects to be benefitted.
95

212 P.2d 764 (Ariz. 1949)

96

Marshall v. Cozart, 95 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. 1956)

97

295 P. 734 (Wash. 1931)
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employees who have been employed for five years or longer should
hold stock in the new corporation. The trustees had not sold the
sawmill to the employee=s corporation and three of its
incorporators sued. The trial court sustained the trustees=
demurrer and the incorporators appealed. In a 5-4 decision, the
court held that the will created a precatory trust that the
complaint was sufficient as against the general demurrer, and
remanded the case for the trustees to submit a plan to carry out
the intent of the testator, i.e., that the Asuggestion@ created a
mandatory duty upon the trustees to sell the sawmill, but leaving
discretion to the trustees the details of the transfer.

98

The case

came to the court again. The court held, 6-3, no trust was
created: AIn the case at bar, there was no imperative duty upon
the trustees to sell the stock of merchandise, mill, and mill
plant to a corporation to be organized by decedent=s employees.@

99

It further held that the will bestowed upon the trustees a
complete discretionary power to convey or not to convey and that
the class of persons referred to as employees of decedent was
indefinite. In deciding the latter issue, it stated it had not
been decided in the case below and based its decision on Morice

98

99

See 7 Washington L. Rev. 296 at 299

10 P.2d 219 (1932) at 223;
replaced (with the writer of the new
judges changed their minds, three of
did not create a trust, one deciding

only one judge had been
majority opinion), but four
the opinion that the words
a trust was created.

29

v. Bishop of Durham.
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VI Negative Precatory Words
Would it be useful for the settlor to express his intent not
to create a trust? He could provide that AThe precatory words
used are not intended to create any obligation on the part of the
trustee/executor/devisee and are not to be considered mandatory.@
This language could go a long way to avoid litigation.
101

For example, in Cooke v. King,

the testators executed a

mutual will devising their property to the husband=s brother Awith
the hope@ he would dispose of the property in accordance with the
testators= wishes known to him. The will went further to express
their intent not to impose any obligation Ato carry out any such
personal wishes or desires@ but having confidence that their
wishes will be carried out so far as practicable. The court, in
holding no trust was created, said: AThe great weight of
authority is to the effect that where the testator uses words
disclaiming an intention to create a trust, no trust will be
implied from the inclusion of precatory or recommendatory
language.@

102

On the other hand, such a statement may not be sufficient.
In Bohon v. Barrett=s Exec=r,

103

a precatory trust was established

100

Supra, footnote 8.

101

Cooke v. King, 61 P.2d 429 (Or. 1936)

102

Id. at 434

103

Supra, footnote 70.
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despite the following language: A... these requests are not to be
legally binding upon [the executor], but I desire to leave the
same entirely to his discretion, and to make no requirement of
him that would be legally binding upon him in a court of equity
or elsewhereBit being my wish to leave the whole matter to his
sense of right and discretion....@
VII CONCLUSION
Courts

104

continue to remind us that an implied (precatory)

trust will be created:
1. If the words are so used that, upon the
whole,
they
ought
to
be
construed
as
imperative;
2.
If
the
subject
of
the
recommendation or wish be certain; and 3. If
the objects or persons intended to have the
benefit 105
of the recommendation or wish be also
certain.
It is the first factor that has been redefined over the
centuries - from mandatory, per se, to the modern trend of
determining the settlor=s intention based on all the facts and
circumstances. The cases illustrate the complexities of
determining the settlor=s intent when precatory expressions are
used.

104

Lines v.Darden, 5 Fla. 51 (1853); and scholars: Bogert,
The Law of Trusts and Trustees, ' 1, Rev. 2nd Ed. (1984).
105

Knight v. Knight, supra, footnote 46; Magnant v.
Peacock, 25 So.2d 566 (FL. 1946); see also William H. Namack,
III, Administration of Trusts in Florida, Chapter 2, p. 53, The
Florida Bar, 2001.
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In the early years, the courts were not interpreting intent
in accordance with its Aplain language@ and gave the precatory
words mandatory meaning. It would clearly not be appropriate to
go in the opposite direction by always giving precatory words
their plain meaning. After all, the settlor=s intent is the
hallmark of a trust.
With the mantra that courts consider all the surrounding
circumstances,

106

there is no reason to believe there will or

should be a bright line test emerging at any future time.

107

The

point was succinctly put as early as 1851 by Vice-Chancellor
Cranworth in Williams v. Williams:

108

AI doubt if there can exist

any formula for bringing to a direct test the question whether
the words of request, or hope, or recommendation are or are not
to be construed as obligatory.@

106

Scott, The Law of Trusts ' 25.2 (4th Ed., 1987): AIn
each case, in reaching its determination the court will examine
the whole of the will and examine it in light of all the
circumstances.@
107

In the twenty-seven states where holographic wills are
valid, issues concerning precatory words and expressions are
bound to continue. The states that allow holographic wills are:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Such wills are permitted
for soldiers and sailors in Maryland and New York. Wills,
Trusts,
th
and Estates, Dukeminier, Johanson, Lindgren & Sitkoff, 7
Edition, Aspen Publishers, 2005, p. 263.
108

1 Sim. (N.S.) 358, 369, 61 Eng. Rept. 139, 143 (1851)
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